Client-level fairness metrics for federated learning are used to ensure that all clients in a federation either: a) have similar final performance on their local data distributions (i.e., client parity), or b) obtain final performance on their local data distributions relative to their contribution to the federated learning process (i.e., contribution fairness). While a handful of works that propose either client-parity or contribution-based fairness metrics ground their definitions and decisions in social theories of equality -- such as distributive justice -- most works arbitrarily choose what notion of fairness to align with which makes it difficult for practitioners to choose which fairness metric aligns best with their fairness ethics. In this work, we propose UDJ-FL (Uncertainty-based Distributive Justice for Federated Learning), a flexible federated learning framework that can achieve multiple distributive justice-based client-level fairness metrics. Namely, by utilizing techniques inspired by fair resource allocation, in conjunction with performing aleatoric uncertainty-based client weighing, our UDJ-FL framework is able to achieve egalitarian, utilitarian, Rawls' difference principle, or desert-based client-level fairness. We empirically show the ability of UDJ-FL to achieve all four defined distributive justice-based client-level fairness metrics in addition to providing fairness equivalent to (or surpassing) other popular fair federated learning works. Further, we provide justification for why aleatoric uncertainty weighing is necessary to the construction of our UDJ-FL framework as well as derive theoretical guarantees for the generalization bounds of UDJ-FL. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/alycia-noel/UDJ-FL.

In recent years, much research has been dedicated to uncovering the environmental impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI), showing that training and deploying AI systems require large amounts of energy and resources, and the outcomes of AI may lead to decisions and actions that may negatively impact the environment. This new knowledge raises new ethical questions, such as: When is it (un)justifiable to develop an AI system, and how to make design choices, considering its environmental impact? However, so far, the environmental impact of AI has largely escaped ethical scrutiny, as AI ethics tends to focus strongly on themes such as transparency, privacy, safety, responsibility, and bias. Considering the environmental impact of AI from an ethical perspective expands the scope of AI ethics beyond an anthropocentric focus towards including more-than-human actors such as animals and ecosystems. This paper explores the ethical implications of the environmental impact of AI for designing AI systems by drawing on environmental justice literature, in which three categories of justice are distinguished, referring to three elements that can be unjust: the distribution of benefits and burdens (distributive justice), decision-making procedures (procedural justice), and institutionalized social norms (justice as recognition). Based on these tenets of justice, we outline criteria for developing environmentally just AI systems, given their ecological impact.

Group fairness metrics are an established way of assessing the fairness of prediction-based decision-making systems. However, these metrics are still insufficiently linked to philosophical theories, and their moral meaning is often unclear. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework for group fairness metrics, which links them to more theories of distributive justice. The different group fairness metrics differ in their choices about how to measure the benefit or harm of a decision for the affected individuals, and what moral claims to benefits are assumed. Our unifying framework reveals the normative choices associated with standard group fairness metrics and allows an interpretation of their moral substance. In addition, this broader view provides a structure for the expansion of standard fairness metrics that we find in the literature. This expansion allows addressing several criticisms of standard group fairness metrics, specifically: (1) they are parity-based, i.e., they demand some form of equality between groups, which may sometimes be detrimental to marginalized groups; (2) they only compare decisions across groups but not the resulting consequences for these groups; and (3) the full breadth of the distributive justice literature is not sufficiently represented.

In recent years fairness in machine learning (ML) has emerged as a highly active area of research and development. Most define fairness in simple terms, where fairness means reducing gaps in performance or outcomes between demographic groups while preserving as much of the accuracy of the original system as possible. This oversimplification of equality through fairness measures is troubling. Many current fairness measures suffer from both fairness and performance degradation, or "levelling down," where fairness is achieved by making every group worse off, or by bringing better performing groups down to the level of the worst off. When fairness can only be achieved by making everyone worse off in material or relational terms through injuries of stigma, loss of solidarity, unequal concern, and missed opportunities for substantive equality, something would appear to have gone wrong in translating the vague concept of 'fairness' into practice. This paper examines the causes and prevalence of levelling down across fairML, and explore possible justifications and criticisms based on philosophical and legal theories of equality and distributive justice, as well as equality law jurisprudence. We find that fairML does not currently engage in the type of measurement, reporting, or analysis necessary to justify levelling down in practice. We propose a first step towards substantive equality in fairML: "levelling up" systems by design through enforcement of minimum acceptable harm thresholds, or "minimum rate constraints," as fairness constraints. We likewise propose an alternative harms-based framework to counter the oversimplified egalitarian framing currently dominant in the field and push future discussion more towards substantive equality opportunities and away from strict egalitarianism by default. N.B. Shortened abstract, see paper for full abstract.

In recent years fairness in machine learning (ML), artificial intelligence (AI), and algorithmic decision-making systems has emerged as a highly active area of research and development. To date, the majority of measures and methods to mitigate bias and improve fairness in algorithmic systems have been built in isolation from policy and civil societal contexts and lack serious engagement with philosophical, political, legal, and economic theories of equality and distributive justice. Most define fairness in simple terms, where fairness means reducing gaps in performance or outcomes between demographic groups while preserving as much of the accuracy of the original system as possible. This oversimplification of equality through fairness measures is troubling. Many current fairness measures suffer from both fairness and performance degradation, or "levelling down," where fairness is achieved by making every group worse off, or by bringing better performing groups down to the level of the worst off.

Efforts furthering the advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) will increasingly encompass AI Legal Reasoning (AILR) as a crucial element in the practice of law. It is argued in this research paper that the infusion of AI into existing and future legal activities and the judicial structure needs to be undertaken by mindfully observing an alignment with the core principles of justice. As such, the adoption of AI has a profound twofold possibility of either usurping the principles of justice, doing so in a Dystopian manner, and yet also capable to bolster the principles of justice, doing so in a Utopian way. By examining the principles of justice across the Levels of Autonomy (LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning, the case is made that there is an ongoing tension underlying the efforts to develop and deploy AI that can demonstrably determine the impacts and sway upon each core principle of justice and the collective set.

Machine learning algorithms for prediction are increasingly being used in critical decisions affecting human lives. Various fairness formalizations, with no firm consensus yet, are employed to prevent such algorithms from systematically discriminating against people based on certain attributes protected by law. The aim of this article is to survey how fairness is formalized in the machine learning literature for the task of prediction and present these formalizations with their corresponding notions of distributive justice from the social sciences literature. We provide theoretical as well as empirical critiques of these notions from the social sciences literature and explain how these critiques limit the suitability of the corresponding fairness formalizations to certain domains. We also suggest two notions of distributive justice which address some of these critiques and discuss avenues for prospective fairness formalizations.

work is creative, problem-solving work which requires high levels of education and is usually well-rewarded. Manual work is skilled dexterous physical work. It usually does not require high levels of education and is typically poorly-paid and highly-precarious (i.e.